University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2005

Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judicial
Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations
Linda Carter
Pacific McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
45 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 259 (2005)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

LESSONS FROM A VENA: THE
INADEQUACY OF CLEMENCY AND JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS
LINDA E. CARTER*

The vindication of rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never
been made to turn on the unreviewable discretion of an executive official or administrative tribunal. 1
Applying the procedural default rule to article 36 claims is not only
in direct violation of the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly
.2
unfiatr.
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I. INTRODUCTION

There are presently 118 death row inmates in the United States
who are citizens of other countries. 3 They represent 31 different nationalities and are incarcerated in 16 states and a federal penitentiary.4 It is likely that most of the 118 death row inmates had a right
to be told that they could contact the consulate of their home country
pursuant to a multilateral treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR). 5 It is also likely that their consular notification
rights were violated and that the consulates were unaware that one of
their citizens was charged with a serious offense. 6 Many of these individuals have argued in court and in clemency that the violation of
their consular notification right under the VCCR adversely affected
the fairness of the criminal proceedings.7
The capital cases involving foreign nationals and the consular notification treaty bring into focus the troubling confluence of the illusory nature of clemency and the limitations of federal habeas corpus.
The inadequacy of post-conviction proceedings in the United States
became acutely apparent when the violations of the VCCR were litigated in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in two recent cases.
This essay explores why both clemency and the legal process fail to
satisfy the treaty's requirements for the consular notification right.
Clemency understandably fails to provide the protection needed,
should not be relied upon for any guaranteed right, and should not be

3. Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States, Death Penalty
Information
Center,
Nov.
28,
2004
[hereinafter
DPIC].
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.larticle.php?did= l98&scid=31 (last visited May 28, 2005).
4. !d.
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261. Over 160 countries are signatories to the VCCR. See id.
6. DPIC. supra no te 3, Reported Foreign Nationals Under Selllence of Death in the
U.S.( indicating that only three of the foreign nationals on death row were timely notified of the
right to contact their consul).
7. See. e.g., United States v. E muegbunam. 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) (summarizing
the response of courts to the VCCR, which has typically involved avoiding the issue whether the
treaty conveys individ ual rights and rejecting remedies of suppression or dismissal). See also
Anthony N. Btshop. The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in the Un ited
States: Whai's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25 Hous. J. I NT' L L. I (2002) (discussing the
response of courts to VCCR claims after LaGrand).
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significantly revised in an effort to improve compliance with the
VCCR. The legal process, however, inexcusably fails to provide adequate protection for the right, should be relied upon to provide a forum to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and should be reformed to
meet this need. Legal reforms are most likely to occur either through
judicial decisions or through legislative action, although executive action is also an avenue. The possibility of the United States Supreme
Court resolving the compliance issue in a case in which it has recently
granted certiorari is discussed. In addition, a recent Presidential
memorandum that has surfaced in the case before the Supreme Court
and that directs compliance with the A vena decision is described.
Both judicial and executive means of compliance with the treaty obligation are desirable and complementary to each other and to legislative reform. This article suggests that, in addition to any judicial or
executive measures, legislative action is also needed. Congress
should take the initiative to pass an amendment to the federal habeas
corpus statute that would permit a hearing when required by a treaty
or other law even when the issue would otherwise be barred under
habeas rules. As presently conducted, there is too great a likelihood
that a VCCR claim will not be heard in a U.S. court, in violation of
the treaty. There is an urgent need for legal reform, and legislative
reform can provide the most comprehensive approach.
II. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS AND CAPITAL CASES
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is not a
recent treaty. It opened for signatures in 1963 and was entered into
force for the United States in 1969.8 Currently, over 160 countries are
parties to the treaty. The right to consular information and notification was not litigated in criminal cases in U.S. courts, however, until
the mid-1990s. The treaty provides in pertinent part:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nations of the sending state ... if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district,
a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said

8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 5, at 21 U.S.T. at 77.
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authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph. 9

The treaty's notification requirement means that any foreign national in the United States who is detained, and whose country is a
party to this treaty, has a right to be told in a timely manner that he or
she can contact the consulate of his or her home country. Routinely
violated in the United States, the consular notification right came to
the fore in capital cases beginning with a Canadian national who was
convicted and sentenced in Texas. 10
The VCCR is an important treaty for foreign nationals accused
of capital or noncapital crimes in the United States. Consular assistance may include humanitarian efforts, such as notifying family
members of the defendant's location. 11 The assistance may also include legal efforts, such as obtaining counsel to represent the defendant, assisting counsel with locating witnesses and documents in the
home country, filing amicus briefs, negotiating with the prosecutor,
and perhaps, most importantly, explaining the differences and consequences of actions in the two legal systems. 12
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION:
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico have all pursued violations of
the VCCR in U.S. courts and by taking a case to the ICJ. In the

9. /d. at 21 U.S.T. at L00--()1, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
10. Faulder v. Johnson. 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996). When the Canadian authorities
became aware of Faulder's case. extensive efforts were made on both diplomatic and legal levels
to spare his life. Texas. however, proceeded with the execution in 1999. See Harold Hongju
Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1085, 1114-15 (2002).
I I. See, e.g., Mark Warren, Consular Notification and Assistance: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, Sept. 2004, H UMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH (providing a summary of possible assistance,
humanitarian, protective. and legal), at http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarrenlattorneys.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2005). See also Michael Fleishman, Note, "Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of
/he Mexican Governmenl in Defense of its Foreign Nationals in Uniled States Dealh Penally
Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359 (2003) (discussing various cases of Mexicans and interaction with their consular officers).
12. This flaw proved fatal for Angel Breard, who did not appear to understand the significance of a plea offer and the consequences of going to trial. He rejected a plea offer to life imprisonment. went to trial and confessed on the stand, and was sentenced to death. See discussion of consular assistance and Breard 's case in John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing
Foreign Nationals: Emerging Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a
Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION, Sept.- Oct. 1998, at 28. See also Bishop, supra note 7, at 16-27
(outlining the Breard case).
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Breard 13 (Paraguay) and LaGrand14 (Germany) cases, the defendants
were tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death without the
required consular notification. All avenues of review in U.S. courts,
including federal habeas, civil lawsuits against the state involved, and
the seeking of original jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court were
exhausted, without achieving any consideration of the VCCR violation on the merits. Clemency was also exhausted. Ultimately, both
Paraguay and Germany obtained provisional measures from the ICJ,
indicating that the United States should take all measures at its disposal to prevent the executions until the ICJ could hear the cases on
the merits. 15 In each case, the defendants were executed prior to any
further ICJ proceedings. 16 Although Paraguay did not pursue its
claim in the ICJ, Germany continued and obtained a decision in its
favor on the merits. 17 In the third case, A vena, Mexico sought relief
in the ICJ on behalf of all 52 Mexican nationals on death row in nine
different states. 18 Because the individual defendants were at different
stages of post-conviction proceedings, some were closer to having
execution dates than others. Once again, the ICJ issued provisional
measures, indicating that the United States must take all measures at
its disposal to prevent the execution of three of the Mexican nationals
who were the closest to having executions pending. None were executed prior to the recent decision on the merits in favor of Mexico. 19
In the two cases in which the ICJ reached a decision on the merits, the Court interpreted the VCCR to require a meaningful recogni-

13. Breard v Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
14. F.R.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
15. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248,258 (Apr. 9)
(order of provisional measures); LaGrand (F.R.G . v. U.S.), 1999 l.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (order of provisional measures).
16. Angel Breard, the Paraguayan citizen, was executed a few days after the ICJ order of
provisional measures of Apr. 9, 1998. Germany's case was on behalf of two brothers. Walter
and Karl LaGrand. One of the LaGrand brothers was executed before and the other after the
ICJ order of provisional measures of Mar. 3, 1999. See Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976.
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, ar http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./article.php?
scid=31&did=582#executed (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
17. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466,514 (June 27).
18. Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. (Avena) No 128, at 18
(Jan. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/irnus/imusorder/imus_iapplication_
20030109.PDF. The suit started for 54 Mexicans in 10 states but was reduced to 52 Mexican
nationals in 9 states. /d.
19. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No 128 (Mar. 31).
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus_imusjudgme nt_
2004033l.pdf (last visited Feb. 19. 2005).
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tion of the rights under the treaty.20 In the first case, LaGrand, the
ICJ found that the treaty requires that the United States "allow the
review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in [the VCCR)."21 The
ICJ further found that the United States could comply with the review and reconsideration "by means of its own choosing." 22
The United States chose to rely on clemency and the usual judicial processes that could result in a refusal to consider the issue.23 In
the second case, A vena, Mexico challenged these choices, arguing that
the treaty required judicial consideration of the violation. 24 The ICJ
agreed with Mexico in the A vena case. The Court emphasized that a
review and reconsideration should "guarantee that the violation and
the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined
and taken into account in the review and reconsideration process. "25
The ICJ stated that the "legal consequences of this breach have to be
examined and taken into account" and that "[t)he Court considers
that it is the judicial process that is suited to this task. "26 The ICJ also
reaffirmed its prior finding in LaGrand that a judicial process that
precluded the consideration of the VCCR issue is inadequate. The
United States is not giving full effect to the rights under the treaty if a
procedural device, such as procedural default in habeas corpus, precludes the consideration of the VCCR violation. 27
20. By signing an Optional Protocol, the United States had agreed to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ for matters concerning the interpretation or application of the VCCR. Optional Pro tocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596
U.N.T.S. 487. In a surprising development. the U nited States withdrew from the O ptional
Protocol on March 7, 2005. A nnouncem ent: All Consular Notification Requirem ent Remain in
Effect, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, available at http://travel.state.gov/newslnews_2155.html# (last
visited Apr. 16, 2005). See repo rt of the withdrawal in U.S. Q uits Pact Used in Capital Cases,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynl
articles/ A21981-2005Mar9.html?.
2 1. L aGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514. For an excellent discussion of the significance of the review and reconsideration findin g, see Christian J. Tams, Consular Assistance and Rights and
Remedies: Comments on the ICJ's Judgm ent in the LaGrand Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L. L. l 257
(2002).
22. LaGrand , 2001 I.C.J. at 514.
23. Avena, Counter-Memorial o f the United States (Mex. v. U.S.),paras. 6.63-().78 (Nov. 3,
2003), available at http:llwww.icj-cij.orglicjwwwlidocket/imuslimuspleadingslimus_ipleadings_
2003 1103_c-mem_06.pdf (last visited Feb. 19 2005).
24. Avena, Memorial of Mexico (Mex. U.S.), paras. 280-282 (June 20, 2003). available at
http:llwww.icj -cij.orglicjwwwlidocket/ imuslimuspleadi ngslimus_ipleadings_20030620_memorial_
04.pdf (last visited Feb. 19 2005).
25. A vena. 2004 I.C.J . No 128, at para. 138.
26. /d. at para. 140.
27. /d. at para.113.
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The ICJ's concerns with the adequacy of clemency and the preclusionary effect of procedural default within the framework of the
VCCR violations are indicative of a problem in post-conviction proceedings in the American criminal justice system. The nature of
clemency is important to an understanding of why clemency cannot
be a vehicle for a review and reconsideration. Moreover, the limited
use, and inconsistent use, of clemency in practice confirms the inability of clemency to serve as an effective means to consider the effect of
a VCCR violation on the criminal proceedings. Federal habeas corpus proceedings, as presently constituted, also cannot adequately
serve the function of a review and reconsideration. Procedural default and other aspects of federal habeas corpus that preclude consideration of the VCCR issue bar effective review. It is, thus, important
to consider both clemency and habeas before turning to possible legal
reforms.
IV. WHY IS CLEMENCY INADEQUATE TO
CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF VCCR VIOLATIONS?
In the 1992 case of Herrera v. Collins, 28 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
"Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law,
and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where
judicial process has been exhausted." 29 In Avena, the United States
used this theory to argue that clemency procedures satisfied the requirement under the VCCR for a "review and reconsideration" of the
conviction and sentence when there was a violation of the consular
notification right. 30 The United States contended that clemency is
"part of the overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process" 31 The ICJ, however, rejected clemency as an adequate
review and reconsideration. The ICJ stated that its interpretation of
the VCCR in LaGrand, requiring a review and reconsideration, was
premised on the idea "that the process of review and reconsideration
should occur within the overall judicial proceedings . . . "32 The heart
of the requirement was an effective means to review and reconsider
the conviction and sentence. 33 The ICJ is certainly correct in its as-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

506 u.s. 390 (1993).
!d. at 411-12.
Avena, U.S. Memorial, supra note 23, at 6.67-6.68.
Avena, 2004 I.C.J. No 128, at para. 136.
/d. at para. 141 (emphasis added).
/d. at para. 142. The Court stated:
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sessment of clemency in the United States. The position of the
United States reflects a misunderstanding or misuse of clemency.
Why is it, though, that the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages
of justice fails to provide an effective review and reconsideration of
the consular notification issue? The answer to this question lies in the
nature of clemency and its application.
Clemency historically/ 4 and to this day in the United States, is
vested in the executive. For federal prosecutions, the clemency
power is vested in the President. 35 For state prosecutions, the precise
mechanism varies, but the authority rests with the executive branch of
the state. In many states in the United States, the governor has the
authority to grant clemency, which includes a pardon, a commutation
of a sentence, and a reprieve. In some states, the power to grant
clemency is vested in an appointed board. In other states, the clemency power is dependent on a combined judgment of executive decision-makers, such as where the governor grants or denies clemency,
but may only grant it upon the recommendation of a majority of a
board of pardons and paroles.36
The judiciary in the United States has taken a "hands-off" approach to clemency. There is virtually no judicial oversight of the executive's grant or denial of clemency. In a 1998 opinion, a splintered
majority of the United States Supreme Court found that there were
"some minimal procedural safeguards" of due process in a clemency

T he Court accepts that executive clemency, while not judicial, is an integral part of the
overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process within the United
States criminal justice system. It must, however, point o ut that what is at issue in the
present case is not whether executive clemency as an institution is or is not an integral
part of the "existing laws and regulations of the U nited States" , but whether the clemency process as practiced within the criminal justice systems of different states in the
United States can, in and of itself. qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the
effective "review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account
of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention", as the Court prescribed in
the LaGrand Judgment. /d.
34. See discussion of the history of clemency in Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (L991); James R.
Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God-Or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and
Executions in Modem Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRI M L. BULL. 200 (2000).
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
36. See Clemency Process by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.o rg.larticle.php?did=126&scid=l3#process (last visited Feb. 19,
2005) for up-to-date information on the process used in individual states. For those states with a
combination of a board recommendation and action by the governor, there are different models. ld. In nine states, the governor must have the recommendation of a board to grant clemency; in nine other states, there is a nonbinding recommendation from a board; and in three
states. the governor sits as a member of a board that decides clemency issues. !d.
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proceeding in a capital case.37 The examples given indicate that this
minimal level is indeed low. Writing a concurrence, which was joined
by three other justices, Justice O'Connor gave examples of flipping a
coin or arbitrarily denying access to a clemency proceeding as a denial of due process.38 She concurred in the case before the Court,
which found that Ohio had provided sufficient due process.39 In subsequent cases, lower courts in the United States have repeatedly
found no due process violation in clemency procedures. 40
With the only oversight of clemency resting with voters who elect
the governors,41 it is not surprising that there is neither consistency
nor standardized reasons for granting or denying clemency. The
VCCR cases exemplify the unpredictability and unreliability of clemency. Osvaldo Torres was recently granted a commutation by the
governor of Oklahoma, in part on the basis of the VCCR violation in
his case.42 Earlier in 2004, however, Hung Thanh Le was denied
clemency in the same state despite raising a VCCR claim.43 Similarly,
Javier Suarez Medina was executed in Texas in 2002 despite the protest of Mexican President Vicente Fox over a VCCR violation.44

37. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 ( 1998) (O' Conno r, J., concurring in part and co ncurring in the judgment).
38. /d. T he fifth vote for a due process right was provided by Justice Stevens, who wrote
separately.
39. Ohio's process involved a hearing by a parole board that recommended a result to the
governor, who then decided whe ther or no t to grant clemency. !d. at 276. The defenda nt was
told on three-days no tice that he could have a pre hearing inte rview. !d. at 289. The defendant's
attorney could not be present at the interview; nor could the defendant submit evide nce to the
board. !d. a t 289. This procedure satisfied the minimal due process standards. !d. at 290.
40. See cases collected in LiNDA E. CARTER & E LLEN K REITZBERG. UNDERSTANDING
CAPITAL P UNISHM ENT LAW 260--62 (Lexis 2004). T he Faulder case, involving a VCCR violation in a capital case of a Canadian national, is an example of how minimal the due process
needs to be. In Faulder's case, the Board failed to hold hearings, p rovided no reasons, and kept
no records. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found n o due process violation. Faulder v.
Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1999).
41. For further discussion o f the e ffect of politics inhibiting the gra nt of clemency, see
Cathlee n Burne tt, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 191 (2003). See also Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George
Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004) (exploring the unusua l nature of clemency and its uneasy relationship with judicial processes).
42. Clemen cy. D EATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.dea thpenaltyinfo.org./
a rticle.php?did=126&scid =13 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
4 3. Despite a recommendation of cle me ncy by the O klaho ma Pardon and Parole Board,
and a 30-day stay by the gove rnor, cleme ncy was denie d and Le was executed in March 2004.
Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976, supra note 16.
44. Current Issues and News about Foreign Nationals, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER. at
http:l/www.deathpe na ltyinfo.org./article.php?scid=3l &did=579 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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Since 1976, 21 foreign nationals have been executed in the United
States, six granted commuted sentences, and three released on the basis of innocence.45 It is probable that in none of the cases involving
foreign nationals, whether executed, commuted, or released , was the
VCCR observed in a timely manner.
On a more general level, cases involving juveniles and inmates
with mental retardation further illustrate how inconsistently clemency
is granted. For example, in 2003, an inmate who was a juvenile at the
time of the crime was executed in Oklahoma whereas an inmate in
Kentucky was granted clemency because he was a juvenile at the time
of the crime.46 In a recent article, Professor Rapaport documents
clemency grants to nine death row inmates because they were juveniles, mentally retarded, or mentally ill during the period from 1977
to 2002.47 During the same period of time, it is estimated that twentyone juveniles and thirty-four mentally retarded death row inmates
were executed.48
Perhaps the greatest discrepancy in the exercise of discretion is
the contrast between Illinois and California. In 2003, Governor Ryan
of Illinois commuted the sentences of all 167 inmates on death row in
that state. 49 In California, with over 600 death row inmates and the
largest death row in the United States, no death sentence has been
commuted since the reinstatement of constitutional capital punishment statutes in 1976.50
Moreover, the rarity of clemency in and of itself negates any reliance on it. Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in the
U nited States in 1976, clemency has been granted in 228 cases, 167 of

45. Foreign
Nationals,
Part
Ill, DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
at
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=583#innocence (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
46. Execution of Juveniles in the U.S., DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?scid=27&did=203#execsus; Clemency, supra note
42. The execution o( defendants who were juveniles at the time of their crimes was recently
held unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
47. Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from
Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. R EV. 349,354 (2003).
48. /d. Professor Rapaport points out that it is difficult to know the number of mentally ill
inmates who have been executed, but the number may well be higher than for those inmates
with mental retardation. !d.
49. See articles cited in Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 40, at 253. Of those 167, 164 sentences were commuted to life imprisonment and 3 were commuted to 40 years. !d. at 253 n.l.
50. Neal Walker, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 266, 26768 (1994) (indicating no commutations in California in last 20 years); State by State Information,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglstate/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2005)(indicating 0 commutations in California since 1976).
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which were the blanket grant in Illinois. 51 During the same period of
time, 960 executions have taken place,52 and there are presently over
3,400 persons on death row in the United States. 53 Clemency is routinely denied in most states in capital cases.
Despite the inconsistency and unreliability of clemency as a
mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice, clemency serves important purposes in the criminal justice system and should not be
changed. Clemency is an "act of mercy" 54 and , as such, is a final safeguard if exercised. Clemency may also serve to correct an unjust result in legal proceedings. Professor Rapaport has pointed out that
clemency additionally serves an important function as an "incubator
and laboratory for defenses and mitigation" that are not yet recognized in legal doctrines.55 As an unregulated, unreviewable process,
clemency may, in fact, at times correct an injustice in the system, either on the basis of innocence, procedural unfairness, or an unjust result. An unfettered power to grant clemency, despite its irregularity,
is a tool in preventing miscarriages of justice.
The proper roles of clemency, however, must be kept in perspective, and clemency must not be the primary vehicle for postconviction review. Although there are a number of thoughtful proposals for greater regulation of clemency with standards and judicial
oversight,56 it is unlikely that this will occur in the near future on a nationwide basis. Clemency should not be relied upon, as the United
States did in A vena, as an effective means of guaranteeing a hearing
on a legal right. In contrast to the unregulated clemency process, we
5 1. Clemency, supra note 42.
52. Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenalty
info.orglarticle.php?scid=8&did=146 (last updated Apr. 21 , 2005).
53. Death Row Inmates by States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=l88#state (last visited Apr. 15. 2005).
54. The meaning of "mercy" itself is complex. For a discussion of many facets of what is
meant by mercy and its implications in the recent symposium in the North Carolina Law Review
see. inter alia, Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong ro Commwe Death Row? Retriburion, Atonement,
and Mercy, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1319 (2004); Austin Sarat, Puuing a Square Peg in a Round Hole:
Victims, Retribwion, and George Ryan's Clemency, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2004); Robert
Weisbe rg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy , 82 N.C.L. REV. 1415 (2004).
55. Rapaport, supra note 47, at 372.
56. See, e.g., Victoria J . Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commwation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996); Alyson
Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 1825 (2002); Stephen Saltzburg, Justice Kennedy Commission Report, Adopted by the
Ho use of Delegates. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AUGUST 9-10, 2004, (recommending that
states establish standards and procedures for executive clemency). available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annualldailyjournalll21C.doc.
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expect standards, procedures, and review in the judicial system. Consequently, a post-conviction process falls within the purview of the
judicial and legislative branches.
V. WHY IS THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
PROCESS INADEQUATE TO CONSIDER
THE EFFECT OF VCCR VIOLATIONS?
An accused person in the United States has a right to a trial and
a direct appeal of any conviction, whether prosecuted in federal or
state court. Although the federal government prosecutes some
crimes, the vast majority of criminal trials occur in state courts. Consequently, much of the litigation raising VCCR violations is occurring
as the result of state criminal prosecutions, and this section will focus
on the procedures that pertain to a state prosecution. In any state, an
accused person will have a trial and a subsequent appeal to a state
appellate court. States also provide for state collateral reviewusually called state habeas corpus. In addition, any person convicted
in state court may seek collateral review by filing a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court. Federal habeas corpus is governed by a statute that was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).57 With layers of review in both state and
federal courts, why are the judicial procedures inadequate to guard
against a miscarriage of justice with a VCCR violation?
In many cases, the judicial procedures may be adequate if reviewed in a pretrial motion or on direct appeal. The problem arises if
the judicial procedure is one of federal habeas corpus. The nature of
collateral review through habeas corpus is limited in scope, access,
and relief. While federal habeas corpus is the last avenue of judicial
proceedings for defendants, the likelihood of a court granting a writ is
remote. Why is that so? The reasons are rooted in concerns for finality and federalism. There is a desire to have criminal proceedings end
without continual legal challenges. There is also a desire that federal
courts not interfere with and, in fact, defer to the judgments of state
courts even on issues of federal constitutional1aw. 58 The result is that
several restrictions on hearing federal habeas claims may result in an
inability for the defendant to have his claim considered. The primary
57. 28 u.s.c. § 2241 (2000).
58. See, e.g, Pete r Hack. The Roads Less Traveled: Post-Conviction Relief Alternatives and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 176 (2003)
(finality and federalism): Andre w Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. R EV. l (2002).
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restriction, though, that affects access to a hearing on the VCCR right
is the procedural default doctrine.59
How does the procedural default doctrine preclude a hearing on
a claim? In general, access to the federal courts through habeas corpus is limited to those claims that were raised in state court so that
state courts had a chance to rule on them. If there is an adequate
state procedural rule not to allow the defendant to raise a new claim,
the defendant will usually be procedurally defaulted and barred from
bringing it in federal court. 60 There are two ways around procedural
default from the case law: 1) cause and prejudice or 2) a fundamental
miscarriage of justice that translates into innocence of the crime or
ineligibility for the death penalty.61 These exceptions to procedural
default are invoked sparingly.
What has happened with the VCCR violations in the face of the
procedural default doctrine? Both the case of Angel Breard and the
cases of the LaGrand brothers are good examples. In neither situation was the VCCR claim raised until federal habeas corpus. At that
point, the federal courts found that the defendants were procedurally
defaulted from raising the treaty claim in the habeas case.62 Moreover, the federal courts in Breard's case explicitly found that he had
failed to establish cause and prejudice as an exception to procedural
default. The complete ignorance of his attorneys of the VCCR was
inadequate "cause" because, according to the court, the treaty was in
existence and accessible to the attorneys through legal research.63 As
a result, the federal courts refused to consider the VCCR claim. That
meant that no court in the United States, state or federal, considered
the effect of a violation of an international treaty on Breard's or the
LaGrands' cases.
59. Other restrictions include the limitations on successive petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)
(2000); the standard for relief when a state court has ruled on the merits, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1):
and the requirements for a certificate of appealability to a federal circuit court. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). Two other hurdles that do not completely deny access, but significantly impact relief
in habeas proceedings are (1) the preclusion of an evidentiary hearing unless certain requirements are met under 28 U .S.C. § 2254 (e)(2), and (2) the harmless error doctrine. Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict").
60. There is no specific rule in the habeas statute on procedural default. As a result, its
parameters are governed by case law. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 26.1 (4th ed. 2001).
61. !d.
62. LaGrand v. Stewart. 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615
(4th Cir. 1998).
63. Prueu, 134 F.3d at 619-20.
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A recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision demonstrates
the judicial confusion about the effect of an ICJ decision and the doctrine of procedural default. Despite the decisions in LaGrand and
A vena, holding that the treaty is violated if a doctrine such as procedural default precludes hearing the claim, the Fifth Circuit found that
the petitioner's case was procedurally defaulted because the VCCR
claim was not raised in state court. Although recognizing that the
ICJ's judgments were to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit considered the
United States Supreme Court's Breard decision to be controlling.64 In
Breard, without the benefit of the ICJ's interpretation of the treaty,
the Supreme Court had viewed procedural default as an appropriate
procedure.65 The Fifth Circuit's decision could be distinguished as a
failure by the court to appreciate the change in the law since LaGrand. However, the court's reticence to abide by the ICJ's decision
is not unique. Courts are typically not familiar with decisions from
international tribunals, and there is debate over the significance of
the decisions.66

64. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec.
10. 2004); cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, l25 S.Ct. 2088 (May 23, 2005). See also Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (finding foreign national petitioner procedurally defaulted on VCCR issue under state post-conviction rules based on reliance on Breard
despite newer decision in LaGrand, although granting the petition on other grounds).
65. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-77. In the course of denying Breard's petition for certiorari,
the Supreme Court commented in a per curiam opinion that Breard had procedurally defa ulted
his VCCR claim by not raising it in state court; that the VCCR provided for the rules of the receiving State to apply. which the Court thought included procedural default; that the 1996
amendments to the habeas statute, which p reclude an evidentiary hearing unless the claim is
raised in state court, were later in time than the VCCR and thus, contro lling; and that it was
unlikely that Breard could have shown prejudice from the VCCR violation. !d. at 375-76.
However, because Breard preceded the ICJ's judgment in LaGrand, th e Breard decision does
not decide the issue of the effect of LaGrand or Avena on the application of the procedural default rule. The Supreme Court assumed that, even with procedural default, the U nited States
was giving "full effect" to the rights under the VCCR as required by the terms of the treaty. See
id. at 377 (asserting that Breard was better advised by his US attorney on his rights in the US
than by the Paraguayan Consulate, and that it would be speculative to say that had his VCCR
rights been respected, he would have pleaded guilty). LaGrand rejected that assumption and
found the opposite to be the case.
66. Compare, e.g., United States ex ret. Madej v. Schomig, No. 98-C1866, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20170 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2002) (finding that LaGrand was binding on the court, although
deciding the case on other grounds) and Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App.
May 13, 2004) (Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing; hearing ordered to consider effect of VCCR violation and ineffective assistance of counsel)
and J. Chapel, specially concurring (expressly stating that VCCR and decision of ICJ are binding on the court) with Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), cert.
denied sub nom Diemer v. Massachusetts, 124 S. Ct. 1144 (2004) (noting that the effect of LaGrandwas "unclear").
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VI. HOW TO BRING THE UNITED STATES
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY:
JUDICIAL, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Commentators have proposed various solutions to the failure to
provide a review and reconsideration of a sentence and conviction
when there is a VCCR violation. The proposals include executive orders, state legislation, congressional legislation creating a cause of action, and federal lawsuits to force state compliance. 67 These proposals deserve serious consideration and implementation in addition to
any judicial decisions or revisions of the habeas corpus statute. Recent developments include both a possible judicial solution and a
novel executive directive. The judicial response might come from the
United States Supreme Court, which accepted certiorari in December,
2004, in a case raising the issue of compliance with the ICJ decisions
in the courts. 68 An executive attempt to resolve the compliance issue
was revealed in the course of the litigation before the Supreme Court.
In their amicus brief, the Justice Department cited a memorandum
from the President to the Justice Department that states an executive
determination to comply with the A vena decision. 69 The Presidential
memorandum is a determination "that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decisions of the International Court of Justice in . .. [Avena] by having state courts give effect
to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision. "70
Amending the habeas statute, however, is also a logical solution re-

67. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The Constitutional Awhority of the Federal Government
in State Criminal Proceedings that Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign Relations, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. I, 4-7 (1999) (positing both congressional legislation and
executive action that would provide avenues to require states to comply with a treaty even if it
affects a state criminal proceeding): John Quigley, The Law of State Responsibility and the Right
to Consular A ccess, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIS. RESOL. 39, 51 (2004) (referring to the
possibility of executive action or enforcement through a lawsuit brought by the Justice Department to compel a state to comply with the treaty in a criminal case): Joshua A. Brook, Note,
Federalism and Foreign A ffairs: How to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey
the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 573 (2004) (suggesting judicial, executive, and
legislative remedies).
68. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted. 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec. 10,
2004); cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (May 23, 2005). See Postscript,
infra at notes 93-98 and accompanying text, for a brief summary of the Court's reasons for dismissing certiorari and the dissenting views.
69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41--42, Medellin v. Dretke, 73 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).
70. !d.
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gardless of the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court or the
effect of the President's memorandum. The judicial and executive
approaches currently underway may prove to be only partial solutions
or may leave open legal questions that could be answered more completely with legislative action. As the primary vehicle for postconviction relief, the habeas statute should be amended to resolve the
controversy and to make it clear that federal courts must review a
VCCR violation even in a situation where the claim would ordinarily
be procedurally defaulted.
A judicial resolution of compliance with the VCCR is uncertain.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Medellin v. Dretke, the case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed earlier, in which the Fifth Circuit found that Medellin's VCCR
claim was procedurally defaulted, the substantive and procedural issues in the case are complicated. As a result, it is difficult to know if
the Court will resolve all of the aspects of compliance with the treaty.
The heart of the substantive dispute is whether the interpretation of
the treaty by the ICJ is the operable law in U.S. courts. If it is, then
there must be a review and reconsideration of the VCCR claims regardless of the procedural default doctrine. The Court accepted certiorari on two questions, both of which raise substantive legal theories
for applying the A vena decision in U.S. courts. The first question is
based on a direct application of the Avena decision.71 The second
question is based on giving effect to the decision as a matter of comity
and uniform treaty interpretation. 72 Both theories are contested by
Texas. The labyrinth of disputed procedural issues in Medellin includes the standards under the habeas statute for granting a certificate of appealability (COA) and whether the Court should stay or
dismiss the case in light of the President's memorandum.
The substantive dispute between Medellin and Texas is particularly complex because it involves both a treaty and a decision from an
international tribunal interpreting the treaty. Medellin argues that
the VCCR, as a self-executing treaty, is binding on the United States,
including the state and federal courts, under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.73 They further assert that because the United
States has agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and to the binding nature of the ICJ decisions, the ICJ decision applies in U.S. courts in the

71 . Reply Brief for Petitioner at i, Medellin (No. 04-5928).
72. /d.
73. /d. at 4-6.
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same manner as would the treaty itselC4 Medellin further claims that
there is an individual right under the treaty that can be raised in federal habeas corpus as the federal statute refers to rights under a
treaty, as well as under the Constitution or federallaws. 75 Texas and
the United States, as an amicus curiae, counter that the obligation to
comply with decisions of the ICJ is only enforceable through the Security Council of the United Nations.76 They take the position that
the A vena decision does not impose a judicially enforceable right under U.S.law. 77
In addition to the contested substantive issues, Medellin has become a procedural quagmire. In their brief, Texas raised the issue of
the standards for granting a COA, a necessary prerequisite to an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus. Texas claims that the Fifth Circuit appropriately declined to issue the certificate. 78 Although the
questions on which certiorari was accepted are not couched in terms
of the COA, the underlying procedural posture is a denial of the
COA. The COA issue, however, is inextricably intertwined with the
substantive issues as the certificate should issue "only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. "79 The focus on the substance of the denial brings the question
back to whether the A vena decision is the operable law. If A vena is
the controlling law, then arguably Medellin has established the "substantial showing," and a COA should have issued. This procedural
posture is even further complicated by the parties' dispute over
whether the statute's language regarding a denial of a "constitutional" right includes or excludes a "treaty" right.80 With the revelation of the President's memorandum, however, the procedural issues
have shifted to whether the Court should grant a stay of the proceedings, dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted, or proceed to the

74. Brief for Petitioner at 36-37. Note, however, that the United States has since withdrawn from the Optional Protocol that agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. See supra text accompanying note 20.
75. Petitioner"s Reply Brief at 8-9.
76. Respondent's Brief at 33-35; Brief fo r the United States at 35.
77. Respondent 's Brief at 32- 33; Brief for the United States at 33.
78. Respondent's Brief at 8-9.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2) (2000).
80. Texas argues that only constitutional issues may be appealed. which precludes rmsing
the VCCR claim on appeal. Respondent's Brief at 9-10. Petitio ner respo nds that the issue is
not properly before the Court, Petitoner's Reply Brief at 16-18. and that the statute sho uld be
interpreted to include treaty claims on appeal. /d. at 20- 26.
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merits. Medellin has moved for a stay,81 and the Justice Department
claims that only the President can decide on compliance with a
treaty. 82 Texas, on the other hand, wants the Court to proceed to the
merits of the case and affirm the Fifth Circuit's denial of the COA. 83
In an interesting twist, Texas and the Justice Department appear to
be at odds over the legitimacy of the President's authority to require
the Texas state courts to conduct a hearing.84
With the complex issues and the advent of the President's memorandum, one of the underlying substantive issues in Medellin is receiving less attention, but is still a critical element of the case. If the
A vena decision applies in U.S. courts, there is a potential conflict between the ICJ's finding that the treaty is violated if procedural rules
bar a hearing and the usual application of the procedural default doctrine to bar claims in habeas cases. The Fifth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Breard, in which the Court indicated that
the procedural default doctrine prevails over the treaty. In their
briefs, the parties in Medellin address the viability of the Breard case
in light of the subsequent decisions from the ICJ in LaGrand and
A vena. Medellin argues that Breard is either distinguishable because
it preceded the ICJ cases or should be overruled. Medellin contends
that the subsequent LaGrand and Avena cases made clear that the
United States is not giving full effect to the consular notification
rights as required under the treaty if the procedural default rule precludes a hearing on the effect of a VCCR violation. 85 Texas argues in
response that the Supreme Court's position in Breard still stands.
Texas contends that the amended federal habeas statute was passed
subsequent to the treaty, is "last in time" and, therefore, is the controlling law. 86 One of the amicus briefs for Medellin counters with the
general principle that the Court should attempt to reconcile a potentially conflicting treaty and statute. 87
There are at least three possible ways in which to reconcile the
obligations under the treaty as interpreted by A vena and the procedural default doctrine. One possible reconciliation would be to allow

81. Motion for Stay, filed Ma rch 8, 2005.
82. Brief for the United States at 41 -45.
83. Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay at 7.
84. Brief for the United States at 41 ; Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay at 4-5 (President's authority is unclear).
85. Brief for Petitioner at 42-45.
86. R espondent's Brief at 10- 1l .
87. Brief of International Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7- 8.
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an exception to the procedural default doctrine, as the Court has
found with a showing of either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of
justice. A second reconciliation approach would acknowledge that
the procedural default rule is not part of the habeas statute; instead it
is a judicial doctrine. If the doctrine is not codified, there is arguably
no statute to contradict the treaty, and the treaty provisions would be
controlling. Yet a third possibility is that, even if procedural default is
viewed as part of the statutory scheme for habeas corpus, the judicially-created doctrine predates the amendments and the treaty or its
most recent interpretations. Any of these approaches would provide
for a review and reconsideration of a VCCR claim as required by the
treaty and still preserve in general the doctrine of procedural default.
Even if the Supreme Court or the President's memorandum provide that a hearing on VCCR violations must be conducted despite a
procedural default, it would be helpful for clarity and future cases to
have Congress amend the habeas statute to provide expressly for a
hearing in a VCCR context. This is especially true in light of the dispute between Texas and the Justice Department over the legality of
the President's determination and the likelihood that the Supreme
Court will not resolve all of the substantive and procedural issues in
the Medellin case. Moreover, the President's memorandum only covers the fifty-one cases of the Mexican nationals at issue in A vena. The
Justice Department brief clearly states that, in their view, the merits
of the legal issues may still be litigated in future cases. 88 Thus, even
the executive approach does not resolve the applicability of the
VCCR and the ICJ decisions in the cases of other foreign nationals on
death row. Although the procedural default doctrine is not directly
embodied in the federal statute and its parameters are defined by
case law, there is a revision to a section of the statute that could remedy the current problem. Section 2254 precludes the grant of a writ
unless the applicant has exhausted state remedies. 89 Procedural default occurs when the applicant has exhausted state remedies, but can
no longer go into a state court to have a hearing on the claim. Section
2254(b)(l) should be amended to add a third subsection (C) [new material in bold] so that the full section would read:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that-

88. Brief for the United States at 47-48.
89. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(b)(l).
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the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State;
or (i) there is an absence of available State corrective
process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
or the applicant is raising a claim, whether or not raised
in state court, that is based on the Constitution or Jaws
or treaties of the United States, and which requires a
hearing, or review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence, on the alleged violation.

With this amendment, individuals would be able to gain access to federal habeas corpus either through exhausting state remedies first or
through basing a claim on a law that requires a hearing or review.
This new provision would not eliminate the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies because subsection (C) would only apply in
those situations where such a hearing or review was required by law.
Nor would the amendment eliminate procedural default as a limiting
device in most habeas cases. By allowing a hearing under limited circumstances, however, even when the issue was not raised in state
court, individuals in the situation of Breard, the LaGrands, or Medellin would be able to have a federal court hear their VCCR claims despite failing to raise the VCCR violation in state court.90 The United
States would be one step closer to compliance with its treaty obligation under the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR.
VII. CONCLUSION
The continuing dialogue on compliance with the VCCR is important in its own right and also for the insights this debate provides into
post-conviction proceedings in the United States. As the ICJ found in
90. Other provisions of the habeas statute would also need to be amended to allow for an
evidentiary hearing, 28 U.S. C.§ 2254(e)(2), and a successive petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2).
As presently written,§ 2254(e)(2) precludes evidentiary hearings unless one of two exceptions is
met, either "(A)(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable: or (ii) a factual predicate that
could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the
facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense." Those exceptions are the same as the exceptions for successive petitions. Both provisions should be amended to include a third situation permitting an evidentiary
hearing and a successive pe tition for a VCCR violation with language such as: "Or (3) a claim
not previously raised that is based upon a violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States, which requires a hearing, or review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence, on the alleged violation."
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A vena, clemency is an inadequate forum for review and reconsideration of rights under the VCCR. Justice Blackmun, quoted at the beginning of this paper, similarly identified the unregulated nature of
clemency as problematic in the enforcement of a constitutional
right.91 The vindication of a right, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or a treaty, cannot be dependent on the unregulated, unreviewable, nonjudicial process of clemency. And yet, the current judicial processes in the United States are likely to be inadequate if the
issue is raised in federal habeas corpus. Justice Stevens, also quoted
at the beginning of this paper, stated that the use of a preclusionary
doctrine in the context of a VCCR violation is "manifestly unfair." 92
There is a manifest injustice in failing to provide a judicial forum for a
review of a treaty violation and its impact on the trial. The ICJ clarified in A vena that the VCCR requires a judicial review and reconsideration. The inadequacies of clemency and federal habeas corpus
proceedings in this context should be a starting point for reevaluating
post-conviction relief in the United States and its efficacy in providing
fundamental fairness in our criminal justice system.

POSTSCRIPT
On May 23, 2005, as this essay was about to be printed, the Court
issued a per curiam opinion dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted in the Medellin case.93 The dismissal was not unexpected
given the unusual posture of the case and President Bush's memorandum directing state courts to hear the VCCR claims of the Mexican
nationals in A vena.94 Nevertheless, the dismissal was a close 5 to 4
decision. Four of the justices would have preferred to stay the proceedings in the Supreme Court pending the outcome in the state
court habeas action. In the absence of a majority for a stay, one of
the four justices opted to provide the fifth vote for a dismissal (Ginsberg), while the other three justices joined the dissent of Justice
O'Connor (Souter, Breyer, and Stevens).95 Justice O'Connor's dissent took the position that denial of the certificate of appealability by
the Fifth Circuit should be vacated and the case remanded to that
91. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 440 (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
92. Torres v. Mullin. 124 S. Ct. 919, 919 (2003) (Stevens, J .. respecting the denial of certiorari).
93. 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005).
94. See discussion infra, notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
95. 125 S.Ct. at 2093 (Ginsberg, J ., concurring); id. at 16 (Souter, J. , dissenting); id. at 17 (Breyer,
J., dissenting, joined by Justice Stevens).
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court to decide the issues or to hold the case until the state court proceedings were completed. 96 Justice Souter alone, in his dissent, would
have decided the issues on which certiorari was granted as an alternative to a stay or a remand. 97 It is likely that the case will eventually be
back before the Supreme Court.98 At this time, however, any judicial
responses to VCCR violations will occur in the lower courts. A judicial solution to the violations of the VCCR, thus, remains unsettled
and a legislative response would provide a more timely resolution of
compliance with the treaty.

96. /d. at 2105 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. /d. at 2 106 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9 8. /d. at 2090, n.l (Court will "in all likelihood have an opportunity" to review the case if Medellin or Texas seek certiorari after state court proceedings); id. at 2093 (Ginsberg. J., concurring) (joining
per curiam opinion, "recognizing that this Court would have j urisdiction to review the final judgment in
the Texas proceedings .... ").

